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The Real Constitutional Problem with the Affordable Care Act1 
 
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost 





Among the main provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) are Title I, the insurance 
coverage expansions; Title II, the Medicaid expansions; and Title III, “Improving the Quality 
and Efficiency of Health Care” (P.L. 111 – 148 [2010], 124 Stat. 119 – 1025). The real goals of 
Title III are not only to create incentives for improving quality and efficiency but also to squeeze 
enough money out of the Medicare program (about $330 billion after coverage expansions, 
according to the CBO) to make a big down payment on the insurance coverage and Medicaid 
expansions under Titles I and II (Congressional Budget Office 2010). 
 
Most of the cost savings are slated to come from revising payment formulas for Medicare 
Advantage plans and reducing payment increases that were otherwise projected for providers and 
suppliers, particularly hospitals and home health agencies.2 There are limits, however, to the cost 
control that can be accomplished by simply cutting provider payments. First, if payment cuts 
simply increase the disparity, already significant, between what Medicare pays and what private 
insurers pay, it is likely that at some point providers may simply cease providing services to 
Medicare beneficiaries (Foster 2010). Second, as this happens, Congress will come under 
increasing pressure to roll back the payment cuts. Although Congress has a better record of 
staying the course on Medicare cutbacks than is commonly believed, health plans and providers 
are politically powerful and have certainly been successful in overturning payment cuts in the 
past (Horney and Van de Water 2009). Third, payment cuts simply result in a one-time reduction 
in payment increases; they do not “bend the curve” of health care cost growth.3   
 
What is needed are payment reform strategies that dramatically increase incentives to 
encourage efficiency of care delivery (and, if possible, to improve the quality of care as well). If 
alternative payment methods that discourage unnecessary utilization, encourage efficient 
provision of care, and improve the effectiveness and coordination of care can be implemented — 
for example, accountable care organizations (ACOs) or medical homes — then real, sustainable, 
“curve-bending” cost savings may be achieved. If these strategies prove attractive to private 
insurers, the disparity between Medicare and private payment may diminish. Moreover, if these 
strategies work, Medicare beneficiaries will be better off too, both because they will be receiving 
better care and because growth in their cost-sharing obligations will moderate.4 
 
But where will these new cost approaches to provider payment come from? We cannot 
count on Congress to lead program innovation. For nearly three decades since the establishment 
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2 For more on the politics of Medicare payment reforms, see Laugesen in this issue. 
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of diagnostic-related group hospital payment in 1982, Congress has micromanaged Medicare 
provider payments, creating ever more Byzantine fee-for-Service or fee-per-admission 
prospective payment systems for virtually all providers (Jost 1999). The details of these systems 
have often been driven by pork-barrel politics, as particular providers have scrambled to make 
sure they get the largest possible piece of this growing pie. In the meantime, ten years’ worth of 
recommendations from the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission to reform payment in more 
fundamental ways have gathered dust on the shelf (Dickerson 2009). Some recommendations 
have been implemented on a demonstration basis, but few have gone programwide. Attempts to 
make fundamental changes — such as competitive-bidding demonstration projects — have been 
blocked by Congress and by the courts.  
 
The ACA appears to be an attempt by Congress to repent and mend its profligate ways. 
But Congress does not seem quite able to trust itself to know how best to proceed with payment 
reform or to resist the allure of pork-barrel politics in the future. Congress has, in Title III, 
created a threefold strategy that reflects this lack of confidence. First, the legislation authorizes a 
host of new payment methodologies, mostly in the form of demonstration and pilot projects. 
Wisely, new payment strategies will first be tested out before implementation. Second, Congress 
delegates sweeping authority to the executive branch for implementing cost-control strategies 
and limits its own authority over provider payment. In some instances, discussed below, 
Congress even allows the executive branch to simply ignore or alter existing law. Third, 
Congress also largely eliminates judicial review of executive decisions regarding provider 
payment methodologies, assuring that Health and Human Services (HHS) decisions will be able 
to move forward expeditiously, unimpeded by judicial intervention. 
 
One provision of the legislation, for example, requires HHS to establish by 2012 an ACO 
“shared-savings” program (section 3022). Although the law lays out fairly specific requirements 
that the ACO program must meet, it also permits HHS to waive any requirement of the Medicare 
statute and of the civil and criminal penalty provisions of the Social Security Act that relate to 
federal health care programs. This provision also broadly prohibits judicial review of most of the 
decisions HHS will have to make in implementing the ACO program. A second section, which 
creates a pilot program for payment bundling, also permits HHS to waive any provisions of the 
Medicare title and of Title XI, which covers fraud and abuse, peer review, and other program 
administration issues (section 3023). The Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), created 
by a third provision (section 3403), will have broad powers after 2014 to propose changes in 
Medicare provider payments to achieve specified cost-control targets, which HHS must put into 
effect unless Congress enacts cost-control measures that meet the same targets or votes to reject 
the IPAB proposal (by a three-fifths majority in the Senate). The decision of HHS to implement 
an IPAB proposal is absolutely immune from judicial review. Finally, and perhaps most 
dramatically, the ACA creates a Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, which has the 
authority to institute a host of demonstration projects to test out new payment and delivery 
models and to take these models programwide if the demonstrations succeed (section 3021). 
Again, HHS is given authority to waive the requirements of the Medicare statute, Title XI, and 
even several provisions of the Medicaid statute, and most of the important determinations to be 




What is happening here is truly remarkable. Congress is delegating to HHS authority to 
waive the provisions of existing law, freeing it from judicial oversight and, in the case of the 
IPAB, even limiting Congress’s own authority to override the decisions of an executive agency.5 
 
Is this constitutional? The Constitution, as we have all been taught, creates a system of 
checks and balances, of separated powers. Three areas of constitutional doctrine would seem to 
apply here. The first of these is the nondelegation doctrine. The Supreme Court has long stated 
that Congress cannot simply delegate its responsibility and authority to adopt legislation to the 
executive branch (A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 [1935]). Of 
course, as a practical matter, Congress must often grant executive agencies considerable 
discretion to implement complex bodies of regulatory law. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
approved broad delegations of authority as long as Congress imposes an “intelligible principle” 
to guide the exercise of discretion (Whitman v. American Trucking Assocs. Inc., 531 U.S. 457 
[2001]; Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 [1989]). Each of the sections listed above 
instructs HHS as to what sorts of spending-control methodologies are encouraged or forbidden, 
and this may be sufficient guidance to satisfy this requirement. The discretion granted by these 
provisions, however, is in stark contrast to the detail and specificity with which Congress has 
written Medicare payment statutes for the past quarter century, and these provisions grant 
breathtaking discretion, particularly to the IPAB and Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Innovation.  
 
A second relevant line of authority is the separation of powers doctrine. The Supreme 
Court has held that the Constitution’s “finely wrought” procedure for enactment of legislation 
leaves no room for the president (and, by extension, the executive branch) to simply cancel 
legislation enacted by Congress.6 Recent cases, however, have allowed the executive branch to 
waive legislative requirements for limited purposes or time periods (Iraq v. Beatty, 129 S.Ct. 
2183 [2009]; Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F.Supp.2d 119 [D.D.C. 2007]). It is likely 
that the ACA waiver provisions would be upheld, as they permit HHS to waive legal 
requirements only for specific programs, and for a limited time with demonstration projects. 
Again, however, the provisions are striking in the extent to which they represent an abdication of 
power in an area where Congress has long jealously guarded its own control.  
 
Third, there is the problem of judicial review preclusion. The courts have in fact 
traditionally been quite reticent to second-guess the operation of the Medicare program, although 
at a few key points they have reined in administrative overreaching (Jost 1999). The Constitution 
gives 5. Congress the power to define the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and prohibitions on 
judicial review have often been upheld (United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 [1988]; 
Cardiosom v. United States, 91 Fed.Cl. 659 [2010]). The courts are reluctant, however, to 
construe review preclusion statutes to deny the courts jurisdiction to decide constitutional 
questions, which would seem to be necessary to protect the ultimate responsibility of the 
judiciary to interpret the Constitution (Bowen v. Michigan Academy, 476 U.S. 667 [1986]; 
Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695 [D.C. Cir. 1987]). If, therefore, a challenge were brought to 
these ACA provisions under the nondelegation or separation of powers doctrine, it would seem 
that the courts could address these questions, regardless of the limitations imposed by the statute.  
                                                            
5 See Jacobs in this issue for a discussion on how agency discretion will create a new political dynamic. 




Although the ACA provisions may pass muster under each of these doctrines 
independently, the cumulative effect of this transfer of power to the executive is troubling. 
Although these sections may provide sufficient “intelligible principles” to survive a delegation 
challenge, if judicial review of the implementation of these principles is precluded by statute, do 
the principles really mean anything? Moreover, are not broad delegations of discretionary 
authority even more troublesome if they include authority to ignore whole titles of the federal 
code? One of the arguments for allowing administrative agencies (as opposed to the president) to 
waive federal law is that their decisions are reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(Bolton 2003). Is allowing agencies to waive legal requirements more problematic if review is 
barred? 
 
To give one example, a complex body of laws regulates Medicare payment for 
chemotherapy (Bach 2009). The IPAB could propose a new payment system that would waive 
these requirements, dramatically reducing payments for the chemotherapy drugs or to doctors 
who administer them. This proposal might arguably violate the clause that enjoins the IPAB 
from establishing systems that ration care or restrict benefits, but these vague limitations 
certainly do not expressly prohibit such a proposal. Moreover, if HHS implemented the proposal, 
this decision would be immune from judicial review. Thus HHS could dramatically reduce 
access to chemotherapy, ignoring existing law and avoiding judicial review. 
 
Desperate times require desperate measures, and Medicare’s financial situation is 
certainly dire. Congress’s temptation to tie itself to the mast in response to the siren song of 
special interests is understandable. It is also perhaps understandable that it should want to free 
Medicare payment reform from the impediments and complications of judicial review. But 
allowing administrative agencies virtually unbounded discretion to 506 Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy and Law rewrite the payment rules, disregarding existing law and free from 
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